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A 'PLAUSIBLE' FUTURE: SOME STATE COURTS EMBRACE
HEIGHTENED PLEADING AFTER TWOMBLY AND IQBAL
JOSEPH W. OWEN*

In the 2007 decision of Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, the United States
Supreme Court retired the well-settled 'notice pleading' standard that
had become fundamental to the scheme of civil procedure in the
United States for nearly 50 years. The Court crafted a new 'plausibility' standard that directed trial judges to dismiss complaints that failed
to state a claim that was "plausible on its face." However, since
Twombly involved a complex set of antitrust claims, it was initially
unclear whether the new standard applied to all civil pleadings or only
to abstract allegations of conspiracy. In 2009, any confusion as to the
applicability of the heightened pleading requirement was settled by
the decision of Ashcroft v. Iqbal. In Iqbal, the Court revisited the
question of what civil litigants must plead under Rule 8(a)(2) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, declaring that the new 'plausibility' standard applies to all civil
pleadings in federal court.
While many scholars have focused their inquiry on federal pleading
practice following Twombly and Iqbal, very little has been discussed
regarding the potential impact on state pleading practice following the
"retirement" of notice pleading. Notwithstanding the fact that neither
Twombly nor Iqbal is binding on the States, several state courts have
chosen to embrace the heightened standard and effectively change the
pleading regime in their respective jurisdiction without action of the
legislature. This Comment analyzes various state court decisions that
both embrace and reject the new 'plausibility' standard, emphasizing
the potential consequences that may flow from the decision to blindly
follow the Court, a practice that has proven to hinder the administration of justice for aggrieved plaintiffs.

I.

INTRODUCTION

As many are now well aware, the federal pleading standard changed
when the Supreme Court articulated a new 'plausibility standard' in
* North Carolina Central University School of Law, J.D. expected 2014; I am grateful for
the insight and advice provided by Professor Susan E. Hauser and Professor David A. Green of
North Carolina Central University School of Law.

104

Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 2013

1

North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 36, No. 1 [2013], Art. 6

2013]

HEIGHTENED PLEADING STANDARDS

105

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly' and further embraced this standard
in Ashcroft v. Iqbal.2 Notwithstanding the seemingly clear language of
Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a
pleading to "contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief,"3 the Supreme Court's recent interpretation of this requirement has been anything but short and
plain.
Heightened pleading in state court may be a 'plausible' future for
litigants as more states join the trend in adopting Twombly and Iqbal
within their own pleading regime. This comment will analyze state
court decisions that have both accepted and rejected the new plausibility standard set out in Twombly and Iqbal with an emphasis on the
states that have chosen to adopt the new standard in their respective
jurisdictions. While the standard set forth in Twombly and Iqbal is not
directly binding on the states,4 many have modeled their respective
rules of civil procedure after the Federal Rules and find Supreme
Court interpretations of those rules "persuasive."' Notably, some
state courts have expressly embraced 6 the plausibility standard while
others have either been silent on the issue or expressly rejected the
standard set forth in Twombly and Iqbal.7
The intentionally ambiguous language' of Rule 8 was a part of a
well-settled practice of "notice pleading" where the plaintiff set forth
1. Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (the new federal standard requires the plaintiff to plead "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.").
2. Ashcroft v. lqbal, 556 U.S. 662,678 (2009).
3. See Fro. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
4. See Roger Michael Michalski, Tremors of Things to Come: The Great Split Between
Federal and State Pleading Standards, 120 YALni L.J. ONINE 109,110 (2010) (noting that the
Twombly and lqbal are not directly binding on the states but are persuasive. Moreover, currently
26 states model their pleading rules after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
5. See e.g., J. Thomas Richie & Anna Manasco Dionne, Twombly and lqbal: The Effect of
the "Plausibility" PleadingStandard on Alabama Litigators,71 ALA. LAW. 75, 77 (2010) ("[T]he
Alabama rules are modeled on the federal rules, and there is a longstanding tradition that
"[flederal cases construing the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are persuasive authority in construing the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure since they were patterned after the Federal
Rules.").
6. See e.g., lannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 888 N.E.2d 879, 890 (2008) (when confronted
with the new standard Mass. Supreme Court held, "[w]e take the opportunity to adopt the refinement of that standard that was recently articulated by the United States Supreme Court in
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly"). See also, Ryan Mize, From Plausibility to Clarity: An Analysis of
the Implications of Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Possible Remedies, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 1245, 1259
(2010) (noting that courts remain split on whether to adopt new plausibility standard).
7. See, e.g., Holleman v. Aiken, 668 S.E.2d 579, 584 (2008) (noting, "[t]o date, North Carolina has not adopted the 'plausibility standard' set forth in Twombly for 12(b)(6) motions to
dismiss." The court of appeals further noted that it lacked authority to adopt a new standard of
review for motions to dismiss).
8. See Mark Hermann et. al., Plausible Denial: Should Congress Overrule Twombly and
lqbal?, 158 U. PA. L. REv. PENNUMBRA 141 (2009) (explaining the primary draftsman of the
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a short and plain statement of their claim to put the defendant on
notice.' In 1957, the Supreme Court first articulated its interpretation
of Rule 8 in Conley v. Gibson, which famously stated that, "[a] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief."o For nearly 50
years following Conley, once the pleading requirement was met plaintiffs were given the opportunity to further develop the merits of their
claims through liberal discovery rules."
In 2007, the Supreme Court crafted a new pleading standard for
plaintiffs seeking relief in federal court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly.12 The Court set aside the Conley "no set of facts" standard,
stating a plaintiff can survive a motion to dismiss "only if the complaint contains sufficient factual matter to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face." 13 The Court further held a complaint must include enough factual matter to "[nudge] their claims across the line
from conceivable to plausible."14 Since this decision changed the way
in which trial judges are to assess 12(b)(6)" motions to dismiss,
Twombly quickly became one of the most cited Supreme Court cases
in history.' 6
While it was initially unclear whether the new standard would apply
to all cases or be limited to Twombly," Ashcroft v. Iqbal settled that
1938 Rules, Charles Clark, said "we made a generalized statement in the rules and to one judge a
short and plain statement may require much more than it does to others"). See also, AM. BAR
Ass'N RuLEs OF1CIVIH PROCEDURE FOR TiHE Dis-nicr CouRrs OF THE UNITED STATEs WiT
Non-s As PREPARED UNDER THlE DIREClON OF THE ADvIsoRY COMMrlHE AND PROCFEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON Fi-DERAL. Ru.Ies AT CiLVELAND, Oio 240 (William W. Dawson
ed., 1938).
9. See Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 Aiuz. L. Riv. 987, 988
(2003).
10. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (emphasis added).
11. See David A. Green, Friend or Foe: The Supreme Court's "Plausible Claim" Standard
ProvidesAnother Barrierfor Plaintiffsin Employment DiscriminationCases, 39 S.U. L. Rr'v. 1, 2
(2011).
12. Jane E. Willis & F. Turner Buford, Articulating Twombly: The lqbal Frameworkfor the
Lower Courts, The Committee on Pretrial Practice & Discovery (A.B.A. Pretrial Practice), Fall
2009.
13. Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (emphasis added).
14. Id. at 547.
15. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
16. See Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. RiV. 1293,1357 (calling
Twombly one of the most frequently cited Supreme Court decisions of all time; noting Twombly
had been cited 14,645 times as of June 30, 2009); See also, Anthony Martinez, PlausibilityAmong
the Circuits:An Empirical Survey of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 61 AIRK. L. Riv. 763, 772
(2009) (noting that Twombly had been cited over 10,000 times since November 2008, and a
significant number are applying plausibility standard outside of the antitrust setting).
17. Since Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly was an antitrust case based on the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-7, it was initially unclear whether the standard was limited to antitrust litigation.
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question in 2009.18 In Iqbal, the Supreme Court revisited the plausibility language in Twombly and confirmed that the new standard applied
to all civil pleadings in federal court.' 9 This comment demonstrates
how the plausibility standard has managed to find its way into various
state courts, and it will assess the potential impact that Twombly and
Iqbal could have on civil procedure in states across the nation unless
Congress steps in and reverses the current interpretation of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2).
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

Conley:

In the landmark decision of Conley v. Gibson,2 0 a group of AfricanAmerican railroad employees filed a class action lawsuit against their
local union alleging the union violated its duty of fair representation
by refusing to represent all employees in an equal manner. 2 ' The
union filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim which was
granted by the district court and later affirmed by the Fifth Circuit.2 2
Since this case involved an important question of employee rights the
Supreme Court granted certiorari. 23 The Court took this opportunity
to clarify that Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does
not require specific factual allegations, stating:
[T]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to
set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim. To the contrary, all the Rules require is "a short and plain statement of the
claim" that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. Such simplified "notice
pleading" is made possible by the liberal opportunity for discovery
and other pretrial procedures rules.24
The Court clarified Rule 12(b)(6), 25 by declaring a complaint should
not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless "[i]t appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts to support his
18. Ashcroft v. lqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). .
19. Id. at 678.
20. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
21. Id. at 42. (employees sought relief from invidious discrimination pursuant to the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 151 et seq., which obligated union agents to represent all employees
fairly and without discrimination based on an employee's race).
22. ID. at 43-44. (the District Court and Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit apparently
relied on the same grounds in granting the defendants motion to dismiss, holding that Congress
had given exclusive jurisdiction of such controversies to the 'Adjustment Board').
23. Id. at 44.
24. Id. at 47 (emphasis added) (respondents argued that the complaint failed to set forth
specific factual allegations to support its general allegations of discrimination and that it was thus
proper to grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim).
25. See FEDo. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
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claim."2 6 At the time the Court was willing to risk the possibility that
some plaintiffs would file meritless claims in an effort to ensure all
plaintiffs had proper access to courts.2 7 Further, the Court rejected
the notion that pleading was simply a "[g]ame of skill in which one
misstep of counsel may be decisive to the outcome [of the case]" and
embraced the idea that the pleading standard should be construed to
simply provide fair notice to defendants of the plaintiffs' claims.28
Following Conley's notice pleading standard, judges were to accept
all factual allegations contained in the complaint as true and draw all
inferences in favor of the pleader, understanding Rule 8 as a device
designed to keep cases in court as opposed to excluding them.2 9 It is
important to note that the reach of the liberal notice pleading standard set forth in Conley was not limited to federal courts since many
states that modeled their rules of civil procedure after the Federal
Rules soon followed the lead of the Supreme Court by applying a similar "no set of facts" standard when assessing a 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss."o
B.

Twombly

In its 2007 decision of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, Justice Souter writing for the majority declared that Conley's "no set of facts"
language had been "questioned, criticized, and explained long
enough." 3 1 The Court went on to declare that Conley had earned its
retirement:
[a]fter puzzling the profession for 50 years, this famous observation
has earned its retirement. The phrase is best forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard.32
Twombly involved a putative class action suit alleging conspiracy
and "parallel conduct"3 3 under the Sherman Antitrust Act 3 4 against
26. Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46 (emphasis added).
27. Kendall W. Hannon, Much Ado About Twombly? A Study on the Impact of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions, 83 NoTRE DAME L. Ruv. 1811, 1818 (2008). See also,
G REEN, supra note 11, at 22.
28. Conley, 355 U.S. at 48.
29. Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to lqbal: A Double Play on the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DIJK L.i. 1, 18 (2010).
30. See Roger Michael Michalski, Tremors of Things to Come: The Great Split Between
Federaland State PleadingStandards, 120 YALE L.J. ONUINE 109, 115 (2010) (noting that Conley
decision had impact on many states who pattered rules of civil procedure after the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure); See e.g., Halvorson v. Dahl, 574 P.2d 1190, 1191 (Wash. 1978) ("[O]n a
12(b)(6) motion, a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff's allegations must be denied
unless no state of facts which plaintiff could prove, consistent with the complaint, would entitle
the plaintiff to relief on the claim." (citing Brown v. MacPherson's, Inc., 86 Wn.2d 293 (1975)).
31. See Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 562 (2007).
32. Id. at 563.
33. Parallel conduct is often used as circumstantial evidence in antitrust cases. See e.g.,
George G. Gordon, Issues in the Law on Parallel Conduct and Proof of Conspiracy, 1 SEDONA
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several local telephone and internet carriers who allegedly conspired
not to compete with each other in their respective markets. 35 In finding the allegations of conspiracy alone insufficient to state a claim
under the Sherman Act, the District Court dismissed the plaintiff's
complaint under Rule 12(b)(6).1 6 On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed, holding that the District Court "tested the complaint by the
wrong standard."" In order to resolve the dispute over the proper
pleading standard for pleading an antitrust conspiracy the Supreme
Court granted certiorari.
The Supreme Court started by criticizing the court of appeals literal
reading" of Conley and then reiterated its "retirement" of Conley's
"no set of facts" standard. Then the Court proceeded to articulate a
new standard stating that a plaintiff "must plead enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."3 9 The Court demanded
more than mere conclusory allegations of parallel business conduct
asserting:
[W]hile a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to
provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than
labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.4 0
Applying these principles to the complaint at issue, the Court held
that "an allegation of parallel conduct and a bare assertion of conspiracy will not suffice" 4 1 and reversed and remanded the case. While the
Court denied that it created a 'heightened' pleading standard,4 2 it is
clear that a heavier burden is now placed on plaintiffs under Federal
J. 147, 150 (2000) (noting, "[I1n its most general sense, the term [parallel conduct] refers
to a pattern of uniform business practices engaged in by alleged conspirators. . .").
34. The Sherman Antitrust Act is codified as 15 U.S.C. H§1-7 (§ 1 of the Act states that
"[Elvery contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint on
trade or commerce among the several States or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.").
35. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 551 (the plaintiffs represented a putative class consisting of all
"subscribers of local telephone and/or high speed interest services from February 8, 1996 to
present." One of the plaintiff's allegations was "parallel conduct" which involves conspiracies or
agreements among competitors in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act).
36. Id. at 552 ("[tlhe District Court understood that allegations of parallel business conduct,
taken alone, do not state a claim under § 1 [of the Act]).
37. Id. at 553.
38. See Id. at 561 ("[O]n such a focused and literal reading of Conley's 'not set of facts,' a
wholly conclusory statement of [a] claim would survive a motion to dismiss whenever the pleadings left open the possibility that a plaintiff might later establish some 'set of [undisclosed] facts'
to support recovery").
39. Id. at 570.
40. Id. at 555.
41. Id. at 556.
42. See Id. at 570
CONE.
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Rule 8(a)(2).4 3 The Court in Twombly based its interpretation of Federal Rule 8 primarily on the notion that conclusory conspiracy allegations lead to enormous amounts of costly discovery, stating: "[I]t is
one thing to be cautious before dismissing an antitrust complaint in
advance of discovery, but quite another to forget that antitrust discovery can be expensive."4 4
In his dissent, Justice Stevens characterized the Court's analysis as a
"dramatic departure from settled procedural law" 45 stating that Conley had long been cited by the Supreme Court as adequate authority
and not until this case was Conley's interpretation of Federal Rule 8
"questioned," "criticized," or "explained away" by the Court.4 6 Moreover, Justice Stevens found this case to be a poor vehicle to achieve
such a dramatic departure from Conley, suggesting:
[I] would not rewrite the Nation's civil procedure textbooks and call
into doubt the pleading rules of most of its States without far more
informed deliberation as to the costs of doing so.47
Rather than the haphazard analysis posed by the majority, Justice Stevens suggested that revisions to rules of procedure should be done in
accordance with well-established procedures set forth by Congress.4 8
In the months following Twombly, there was significant confusion
among the lower federal courts and litigants as to whether the "plausibility" standard was limited to federal antitrust cases or whether it
applied to all civil pleadings.4 9 The decision marked a significant
change in civil procedure since Conley had become a staple in both
federal and state courts for nearly 50 years.5 0 It was soon apparent
that Twombly would become one of the most cited Supreme Court
opinions of recent history. For instance, by November 2007, 168 circuit
43. See GREEN, supra note 11, at 20-21; See also Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203,
210 (3d Cir. 2009) (noting the "pleading standards have seemingly shifted from simple notice
pleading to a more heightened form of pleading, requiring the plaintiff to plead more than the
possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss")
44. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 546.
45. Id. at 573.
46. Id. at 578 (Justice Stevens noted that Conley had been authority in dozens of opinions of
the Supreme Court and not one of the 16 opinions questioned its adequacy).
47. Id. at 579 (noting that the petitioners nor the six amici who filed briefs in support of the
petitioners did not requested the Conley formation to be retired).
48. Id.; See generally Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. H§2072-2074 (2011).
49. Colleen McMahon, The Law of Unintended Consequences: Shockwaves in the Lower
Courts After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. RiEv. 851, 858 (2008) ("Twombly
had effectively overruled Conley and imposed a new, more-stringent pleading standard for (1)
all cases not already subject to "heightened" pleading under Rule 9(b) and the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act; (2) all conspiracy cases; or (3) antitrust conspiracy cases only").
50. See Alana C. Jochum, Pleadingin Ohio After Bell Atlantic v. Twombly and Ashcroft v.
lqbal: Why Ohio Shouldn't "Notice" A Change, 58 CLEV. S-r. L. Riv. 495, 508 (2010) (noting
that many states followed Conley's well established notice pleading standard).
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court decisions and over 2,000 district court decisions had cited the
Twombly opinion."
C.

Iqbal

Any confusion as to whether Twombly was limited to antitrust litigation was settled by the Supreme Court in its 2009 decision of Ashcroft v. Iqbal. 52 Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on
the United States, respondent Iqbal, a Pakistani Muslim, was arrested
by federal law enforcement and placed in a New York detention
center.5 3 Once in custody, Iqbal was deemed a person of "high interest" and was placed under maximum-security conditions where he remained until entering a plea of guilty on charges of conspiracy to
defraud the United States.5 4 Subsequent to his release, Iqbal filed a
Bivens55 action against 34 current and former federal officials5 6 and 19
unnamed correctional officers, in which he alleged, inter alia, mistreatment based on his race, religion and national origin.
The petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint under Rule
12(b)(6) 5 ' arguing the respondent failed to state sufficient allegations
to show their involvement in the unconstitutional conduct.5 1 In denying the motion to dismiss, the District Court found, "[i]t cannot be
said that there [is] no set of facts on which [respondent] would be
entitled to relief" relying principally on Conley's "no set of facts" language.5 1 While the petitioners' appeal to the Second Circuit was pending, the Supreme Court decided Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
which presented new criteria for judges to utilize when considering
whether a complaint is sufficient survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. 6 0 Considering the case before it, the Second Circuit acknowledged Twombly's retirement of Conley's "no set of facts" standard
and concluded that Twombly required a 'flexible plausibility standard'
that requires some factual allegations "in those contexts where such
51. See MCMAnON, supra note 49, at 852 ("[A]s of November 21, 2007, a Westlaw search
indicated that Twombly had been cited in 168 decisions by circuit courts and 2,159 decisions by
district courts").
52. Ashcroft v. lqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
53. Id. at 666.
54. Id. at 668 (respondent also plead guilty to charges relating to identification documents).
55. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (a "Bivens action" is commonly brought by persons who allege constitutional violations against federal law
enforcement agents).
56. Among the federal officials named in the Bivens action were John Ashcroft, the 79th
Attorney General of the United States and former director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), Robert S. Mueller. See lqbal, 566 U.S. at 666.
57. FE). R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
58. lqbal, 556 U.S. at 669.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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amplification is needed to render the claim plausible."6 1 The court of
appeals affirmed the holding of the district court, stating the case was
not one of those "contexts" requiring "amplification," and thus the
respondent's complaint was sufficient to state a claim for relief. 6 2 To
address the uncertainty surrounding the new pleading standard after
Twombly, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.6 3
The Supreme Court, with Justice Kennedy writing for the majority, 6 4 expressly rejected the notion that Twombly should be limited to
"pleadings made in the context of an antitrust dispute," declaring that
such an argument is not supported by Twombly and is "incompatible
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."" The Court went on to
note that "Twombly expounded the pleading standard for 'all civil actions' and it applies to antitrust and discrimination suits alike."6 6 The
Court summarized the new 'plausibility standard' by stating:
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility
standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more
than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a
complaint pleads facts that are "merely consistent with" a defendant's
liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
'entitlement to relief.'6 7
The Court went on to explain the two "working principles" underlying the Court's decision in Twombly insofar that legal conclusions in
the complaint will not be 'accepted as true' and that only a complaint
that states a 'plausible claim for relief' will survive a 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss."
D.

Iqbal's Two-Pronged Approach:

Although it was far from clear, the Court articulated a "two-pronged" approach for assessing a complaint under the new plausibility
61. Id. at 670; (quoting Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 158 (2d Cir. 2007).
62. . Id. (Judge Cabranes concurred, agreeing with the majority's discussion of pleading
requirements but expressed concern since the suit subjected high-ranking government officials to
the burdens of discovery on "a complaint as nonspecific as respondent's").
63. Id.
64. Id. at 666. Justice Kennedy was joined by Chief Justice Roberts along with Justice Alito,
Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas.
65. Id. at 684.
66. Id. (emphasis added).
67. Id. at 678 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). (internal citations omitted, emphasis
added).
68. Id. at 678-79 (further noting that t "recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements donot suffice").
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standard. First, a reviewing court is to identify those allegations in the
complaint that are merely legal conclusions." Conclusory allegations
"are not entitled to the assumption of truth.""o The second prong requires reviewing judges to "draw on its judicial experience and common sense"7 1 in making the determination as to whether a plausible
claim for relief has been shown.72
Applying the foregoing principles to the case before it, the Court
concluded that Iqbal's complaint did not "[nudge] [his] claims of invidious discrimination across the line from conceivable to plausible."7 1
The Court reached such a conclusion by first identifying those allegations in the complaint that were not entitled to the assumption of
truth.7 4 Iqbal pled, inter alia, that the petitioners "[k]new of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject him to harsh
conditions of confinement as a matter of policy, solely on account of
his religion, race, and/or national origin for no legitimate penological
reason."7 5 In response, the Court held that such "bare assertions" like
those in Twombly amount to "nothing more than a 'formulaic recitation' of the elements of a constitutional discrimination claim" and thus
are not entitled to the assumption of truth since they are merely
conclusory.
After disregarding the conclusory allegations, the Court considered
the factual allegations in the respondent's complaint to determine
whether "they plausibly suggested an entitlement to relief." 7 Iqbal's
complaint alleged, inter alia, "the FBI. . . arrested and detained

thousands of Arab Muslim men as part of its investigation of the
events of September 11" and that the "policy of holding post-September 11th detainees in highly restrictive conditions until they were
'cleared' by the FBI was approved by Defendants Ashcroft and Mueller."7 8 Although the allegation was taken as true, the Court held that
such allegations did not give rise to a "plausible inference that respon69. Id. at 679.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. (noting, "[wihen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume
their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief").
73. Id.at 680 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
74. Id. Recall from the "two-pronged test" that these portions of the complaint not entitled
to the assumption of truth are "conclusory" statements.
75. Id. (internal quotations removed)(the quoted allegation is referencing paragraph 96 of
the relevant complaint along with App. to Pet. for Cert. at 173a-174a. Id. One of the principle
allegations in the complaint was that Attorney General John Ashcroft was the "principal architect" of the invidious policy and that Robert Mueller was "instrumental" in adopting and executing it).
76. Id. at 681.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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dent's arrest was a result of unconstitutional discrimination" 79 and
that such an allegation failed to "[nudge] his claim of purposeful discrimination 'across the line from conceivable to plausible."so
E.

A Misapplication of Twombly?

Ironically, Justice Souter, the very person who crafted and embraced the 'plausibility' language in Twombly, rejected the majority's
reasoning in Iqbal, stating that the majority "misapplie[d] the pleading standard under Twombly.""' Specifically, Justice Souter found deficiencies in the majority's analysis of the plausibility language of
Twombly insofar that:
Twombly does not require a court at the motion-to-dismiss stage to
consider whether the factual allegations are probably true. We made it
clear, on the contrary, that a court must take the allegations as true,
no matter how skeptical the court may be. 82
Justice Souter distinguished the circumstances in Twombly from the
instant case, pointing out that in Twombly "[t]he conduct alleged was
'consistent with conspiracy, but just as much in line with a wide swath
of rational business strategy""' while, in contrast, the conduct in the
instant case was "neither confined to 'naked legal conclusions nor
consistent with legal conduct."' 8 4 Thus, according to Justice Souter, by
alleging willful and deliberate discrimination solely on the basis of
race, religion and national origin, Iqbal's complaint clearly contain[ed]
"enough factual matter to state a claim that is plausible on its face."
Further, Justice Souter suggested that the majority misapplied
Twombly by viewing the allegations against Ashcroft and Mueller in
"isolation" as opposed to viewing the entire complaint as a whole.86
By quickly categorizing the allegations as "bare assertions" and "conclusory" the majority failed to take the complaint as a whole,87 giving
79. Id. at 682.
80. Id. at 683 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. et al. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 570 (2007).
81. Id. at 688 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter was joined by Justice Stevens, Justice
Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer.
82. Id. at 696 (quoting Twombly 550 U.S. at 555). (Justice Souter also noted approvingly
that "[a] court must proceed 'on the assumption that all the allegations of the complaint are true
(even if doubtful in fact)"'), Twombly at 556 (pare, and that "Rule 12(b)(6) does not countenance. . .dismissals based on a judge's disbelief of a complaint's factual allegations[.]" Neitzke v.
Williams 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).)
83. Id.(quoting Twombly at 554).
84. Id. at 696-97.
85. Id. at 697 (quoting Twombly at 570).
86. Id. at 698 ("[T]he fallacy of the majority's position, however, lies in looking at the relevant assertions in isolation").
87. Id. (Iqbal's complaint alleged that Ashcroft and Mueller "knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject him to a particular, discrete discriminatory policy" which
was set forth in detail. Justice Souter pointed out that lqbal's allegations were not merely a bare
assertion that Ashcroft was the "architect of some amorphous discrimination, or that Mueller
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"Ashcroft and Mueller 'fair notice of what the claim.

115
.

. is and the

grounds upon which it rests.""' Justice Breyer, who joined Justice
Souter in his dissent, argued that the majority's extension of Twombly
was unwarranted since "[tlhe law. . . provides trial courts with other
legal weapons designed to prevent unwarranted interference" and approved of structur[ing] discovery in ways [to] diminish the risk of imposing unwarranted burdens upon public officials as a good
example."89
Since Twombly and Iqbal, the defense bar has utilized the new
"plausibility" standard and routinely moves to dismiss cases for purportedly failing to state a claim for relief as failing "to show the plausibility of a claim.""o Notably, since Twombly and Iqbal, the perception
amongst those in the legal community is that there has been an increase in granting motions to dismiss in cases alleging civil rights violations, employment discrimination, class action suits and pro se
proceedings. 9 '
III.
A.

LIFE AFTER IOBAL: IMPACT ON PLAINTIFFS IN
FEDERAL COURT

Federal Judicial Center Report
1. 12(b)(6) Motions to Dismiss Following Iqbal

In March 2011, at the request of the Judicial Conference Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules, the Federal Judicial Center released a report titled "Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim After
Iqbal."9 2 The empirical study examined all motion activity in 23 federal districts courts in 2006 and 2010, while excluding all prisoner
cases and pro se parties.93 First, the study found there was a general
increase from 2006 to 2010 in the rate of filing 12(b)(6) motions to
dismiss for failure to state a claim.9 4
was instrumental in an ill-defined constitutional violation" but rather that "they helped to create
the discriminatory policy. . described.")
88. Id. at 698-99 (quoting Twombly, at 555).
89. Id. at 700 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
90. See Miller, supra note 29, at 20 (noting that 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss based on
Twombly and Iqbal have become routine, and "the perception among many practicing attorneys
and commentators is that the grant rate [of motions to dismiss] has increased]. .
91. Id.; See also GREEN, supra note 11, at 26 (noting employment discrimination and civil
rights cases have been adversely affected by application of the new plausibility standard set out
by the Supreme Court in Twombly and Iqbal).
92. JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MOTIONs To Dismiss FOR FAILURE To
STArE A CLAI AAFFER IOBAL: REPORT TrO TiHE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE Aivisony COMMirEE
ON CivIL RULES ( 2011),

93. Id. at 5-6. (The study included motion activity in the years 2006 and 2010 in order to
assess the data that "[njeither anticipates the decisions of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly nor
responds to the decision in Ashcroft v. lqbal in the absence of appellate court guidance.").
94. Id. at 8.

https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol36/iss1/6

12

Owen: A Plausible Future: Some State Courts Embrace Heightened Pleading

116

NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:104

Specifically, the Federal Judicial Center study reported that "motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim were filed in 6.2% of all
cases in 2009-2010, an increase of 2.2% since 2005-2006.""9 Moreover,
there was an increase in cases with motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim in 2009-2010 compared to 2005-2006.96 Additionally, the
study found motions to dismiss were likely to be filed in cases removed from state court to federal court, but indicated that there was
no general increase in removal rates from 2005 through 2009 in states
with notice pleading standards. 97
2. Outcome of 12(b)(6) Motions Following Iqbal
The Federal Judicial Center study found that courts were more
likely to grant 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim
following Iqbal, however, the increase extended only to motions
granted with leave to amend.9 8 However, the study found that motions to dismiss were more likely to be granted without leave to
amend when they were directed at an amended complaint.99
The study placed significant weight on the fact that during the evaluation period there was a significant increase in lawsuits involving financial instruments."'o Specifically, these types of cases were more
likely to be removed to federal court and were more likely to face
motions to dismiss, rising from 9.1% in 2005-2006 to 27.7% in 20092010.101 In 2010, orders responding to 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss in
cases challenging financial instruments were more likely to be granted
with respect to all claims by at least one plaintiff. 102
95. Id.
96. Id. at 10.
97. Id. at 11; see also id. at 13 ("It first appears that motions to dismiss for failure to state a
claim were more likely to grant all or some of the relief requested in 2010 than in 2006 (75%
granted in 2010 and 66% in 2006), a closer inspection reveals that the increase extends only to
motions granted with leave to amend.").
98. Id. at 13; see also id. at 22 (noting that this was true both before and after Supreme
Court decisions and noting that courts take earlier amendments to the complaint into account
when deciding motions to dismiss).
99. Id. at 22; see also id. at 12 ("Cases challenging financial instruments increased by 214%,
from 1,524 cases in 2006 to 4,790 in 2010, apparently due to the economic downturn in the
housing market.... These cases include federal claims under statutes such as the Truth in Lending Act, the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, and the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act.").
100. See Id. at 12.
101. Id.; see also id. at 100 (finding the great majority of cases involving "financial instruments" involved cases by individuals suing lenders and/or loan servicing companies over the
terms of their mortgage); see also id. at 21 (recognizing that there was no general increase in the
likelihood that 12(b)(6) motions were granted in other types of cases not involving "financial
instruments").
102. Id. at 19.
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Skepticism Surrounding the Federal Judicial Center's Report

A quick glance at the findings of the Federal Judicial Center's 2011
report would lead many to believe that Twombly and Iqbal have had
little effect on plaintiffs in federal court. However, several empirical
studies suggest the impact on civil litigation is far greater than the
Federal Judicial Center report would lead one to conclude. 10 3
For example, an empirical study conducted by Professor Patricia
Moore,1 04 measuring motion activity after Iqbal, found a significantly
higher rate of dismissal than suggested by the Federal Judicial Center
(FJC).'os Specifically, Professor Moore's study suggested, "[W]hile the
FJC found that in the first six months of 2010 46% of the orders
granted all relief sought by the 12(b)(6) motion, I found 53% of the
orders granted all relief sought under the motion under Iqbal while
still excluding pro se plaintiffs." 10 6 Further, if pro se plaintiffs were
added back in, 46% of the 12(b)(6) motions were granted in full under
Conley while 61% of the motions were granted in full following
Iqbal.'7 Professor Moore's study included 1500 federal district court
cases involving 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss: 500 cases which evaluated
motions to dismiss under the retired Conley standard, 500 cases evaluated under Twombly, and 500 cases evaluating motions under the twopronged test set forth in Iqbal.os
While Professor Moore does not suggest the FJC study was erroneously preformed, she does point out that the FJC's findings were
"completed at the direction of federal judges" and thus may not be
completely impartial.1 09 Above all, Professor Moore is doubtful that
103. See generally Jonah B. Gelbach, Locking the Doors to Discovery? Assessing the Effects
of Twombly and lqbal on Access to Discovery, 121 YAuE L.J. 2270 (2012); see also Patricia
Hatamyar Moore, An Updated Quantitative Study of Iqbal's Impact on 12(b)(6) Motions, 46 U.
Ricii. L. RErv. 603 (2012) (noting that there has been a 'significant' increase in 12(b)(6) motions
to dismiss following Twombly and Iqbal notwithstanding the Federal Judicial Center study).
104. See Patricia Hatamyar Moore, An Updated Quantitative Study of Iqbal's Impact on
12(b)(6) Motions, 46 U. Ricii. L. REv. 603 (2012) (Patricia Hatamyar Moore is an Associate
Professor of Law at St. Thomas University School of Law and she has conducted two detailed
empirical studies on the effect of Ashcroft v. Iqbal on civil pleadings); see also Patricia W.
Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading:Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. Rev.
553, 598 (2010) (Professor Moore's previous empirical study).
105. Patricia Hatamyar Moore, An Updated QuantitativeStudy of Iqbal's Impact on 12(b)(6)
Motions, 46 U. Ricti. L. Riv. 603, 608 (2012)
106. Id. at 608-09.
107. Id. at 609; see also id. at 610-611 (Professor Moore excluded some of the 1500 cases for
various reasons e.g., cases not involving a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss were not considered along
with cases that were decided under a heightened pleading standard such as under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 9(b) or under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act).
108. Id. at 610.
109. Id. at 653; see also id. at 652 (noting, "[I] fear that Iqbal is another brick in the wall
blocking access to civil justice and jury trial. . the wall is taking shape with increased use of
summary judgment, restrictive class action interpretations, the approval of mandatory arbitration clauses, and a parsimonious attitude towards plaintiff's attorney's fees.").
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the increase in granting motions to dismiss was due primarily to "frivolous" claims being presented to the court, rather Professor Moore
suggest that the change is due in large part to "tort reform" measures
along with a general distaste for plaintiff's attorneys in the federal
judiciary."o
Other scholars have also suggested that the FJC report may not be
the best indication of the true impact of Twombly and Iqbal on civil
litigation. Among them is Jonah Gelbach, an economics expert and
law student at Yale Law School, who recently conducted an empirical
1
study examining motion activity following Iqbal."'
Gelbach's study
measured the effects of Twombly and Iqbal by not only comparing the
12(b)(6) motions to dismiss data under Conley and Iqbal but by also
focusing on four distinct factors: (i) judicial behavior effects; (ii) defendant selection effects (iii) plaintiff selection effects; and (iv) settlement selection effects.112
By focusing on changes in party behavior such as a plaintiff's willingness to even file a complaint in response to heightened pleading,
Gelbach suggests that the measure of Twombly and Iqbal's impact is
far greater than previously thought."' Specifically, Gelbach's study
found:
[a]mong cases not involving financial instruments, civil rights or employment discrimination, Twombly and Iqbal have negatively affected
at least 21.5% of cases that faced a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss during
the post-Iqbal period, thus between one-fourth and two-fifth of cases
failed to reach discovery on at least some claims in the post-Iqbaldata
window." 4
Gelbach argues that Twombly and Iqbal have had a much larger
effect on plaintiff's access to discovery then the FJC report would sug110. Id. at 652-654.
111. See generally Jonah B. Gelbach, Locking the Doors to Discovery? Assessing the Effects
of Twombly and Iqbal on Access to Discovery, 121 YALE L.J. 2270 (2012) (Jonah B. Gelbach is a
third year law student at Yale Law School and holds a Ph.D. in Economics from Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (MIT); Gelbach's study of Twombly and Iqbal suggest that the decisions
of the Supreme Court have negatively impacted plaintiffs in various ways).
112. Id. at 2275-2276 (according to Gelbach, "judicial behavior effects" assesses the likelihood that more motions to dismiss might be granted in cases that would have motions to dismiss
under either pleading regime; "defendant selection effects" considers that some defendants
might file motions to dismiss in cases that they would otherwise answered under the previous
Conley standard, and the fact that some of the new motions to dismiss will be granted; "plaintiff
selection effects" considers the fact that plaintiffs might choose not to file some cases they think
would be either more expensive to litigate or less likely to get to discovery. Essentially, the idea
is that some plaintiffs may chose not to file a lawsuit as a result of increased pleading standard
when faced with motions to dismiss; "settlement selection efforts" considers how the parties
perception of the gains and cost of litigation might be either more expensive to litigate or less
likely to get to discovery).
113. Id. at 2277.
114. Id. at 2278.

Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 2013

15

North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 36, No. 1 [2013], Art. 6

2013]

HEIGHTENED PLEADING STANDARDS

119

gest, noting that even a slight increase in 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss
after Iqbal constitutes "strong evidence" that the plausibility standard
has had a substantial impact.' 1 5 Gelbach further noted, "[I]f defendants file motions to dismiss against a stronger set of complaints but
win just as often, then judges must be dismissing complaints that they
would not have dismissed before."1 16
C.

The Real Consequences of 'Plausibility' Pleading

As the foregoing studies suggest, one thing is consistently foundan increase in 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim
following Twombly and Iqbal. While it is difficult to truly quantify the
actual impact of the new 'plausibility' standard, it is my contention
that access to courts has been diminished for aggrieved plaintiffs
across the nation. Tony Mauro of the National Law Journal cited a
wide range of cases demonstrating the impact on plaintiffs shortly after the ruling in Iqbal, for example: "[A] major lawsuit against the
markers of an anti-psychotic drug was dismissed on Iqbal grounds," 7
along with a case challenging the government's no-fly list brought by a
Muslim woman who claims she was a victim of racial profiling."' 18
In Ibrahim v. Dep't of Homeland Security, a Muslim Ph.D. student
at Stanford alleged that she was mistakenly placed on a "no-fly" list,
was prevented from flying and detained in a holding cell in San Francisco based on her religious beliefs and national origin."' The defendants moved to dismiss Ibrahim's complaint, citing Iqbal, arguing the
allegations were "insufficient" to state a claim for discriminatory purpose.12 0 District Court Judge Alsup granted the defendant's 12(b)(6)
115. See Jonah Gelbach, Measuring Twombly and lqbal's Impact on Access to the Courts: An
Economic Model, AMERICAN CONsTrruTION Socui'ry BiLOG (December 21, 2011), http://www.

acslaw.org/acsblog/measuring-twombly-and-iqbal%E2%80%99s-impact-on-access-to-the-courtsan-economic-model.
116. Id.
117. Tony Mauro, Plaintiffsgroups Mount Effort to Undo 'Iqbal', Tim NATIONAL

LAW JOUR-

NAL (September 21, 2009), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202433931370&Plaintiffs
GroupsMountEffort_toUndoSupremeCourts IqbalRuling; see also In Re Seroquel Products Liab. Litig., 244 F.R.D. 650 (M.D. Fla. 2007).
118. Tony Mauro, Plaintiffsgroups Mount Effort to Undo 'Iqbal',Tii. NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL (September 21, 2009), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202433931370&Plaintiffs
GroupsMount Effortto_..Undo SupremeCourtsjIqbalRuling; see also Ibrahim v. Dep't of
Homeland Sec., No. 06-00545, 2009 WL 2246194, at *10 (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2009).
119. Id. at *3 (plaintiff Rahinah Ibrahim is a Muslim woman and citizen of Malaysia, in 2005,
she was a doctoral student at Stanford University. She had no criminal history nor any links to
terrorist activity, plaintiff was detained at the San Francisco International Airport where she was
subjected to a search and questioning by law enforcement).
120. Id. at *8 ("[T]he defendants invoke lqbal to argue that [plaintiffs] factual allegations are
insufficient to demonstrate discriminatory purpose and to plead claims for violations of her
rights to freedom of religion, freedom of association, and equal protection. .they argue that like
in Iqbal, [plaintiffs] detention was non-discriminatory and the fact that she is an identifiable
Muslim is only incidental.")
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motion to dismiss upon the finding that Ibrahim's allegations of discrimination were "conclusory under Iqbal" and merely a "recital of
the elements of a cause of action."1 2 1 However, Judge Alsup did not
necessarily agree with the heightened pleading standard, noting:
[A] good argument can be made that the Iqbal standard is too demanding. Victims of discrimination and profiling will often not have
specific facts to plead without the benefit of discovery. District judges,
however, must follow the law as laid down by the Supreme Court.122
Ibrahim is just one of many cases that were dismissed shortly after
Iqbal for pleading "conclusory" allegations that were not sufficient to
"nudge claims across the line from conceivable to plausible."1 23 Unfortunately, these types of dismissals have become commonplace in
federal courts. What is not as clear is how the plausibility standard has
affected state courts.
IV.

STATE COURTS THAT EMBRACE PLAUSIBILITY STANDARD

Since Twombly and Iqbal involved only the Supreme Court's interpretation the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,the decisions were not
directly binding on the states.124 However, many states have patterned
their own rules of civil procedure after the Federal Rules in an effort
to promote "procedural uniformity."1 2 5 Not surprisingly, some state
courts have expressly embraced the heightened pleading standard after Twombly and Iqbal. Below I analyze the decisions of state courts
that have chosen to adopted the Supreme Court's interpretation of
Federal Rule 8(a)(2)12 6 to apply to their own pleading regime.
A.

Massachusetts:

Even before the Supreme Court's decision in Iqbal, the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts took the time to expressly adopt the plausibility language in Twombly.127 In Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., owners
of certain vehicle models filed a class action suit against Ford Motor
Company alleging, inter alia, deceptive trade practices and breach of
implied warranty.128 Specifically, the plaintiff's complaint alleged that
121. Id. at *9.
122. Id. at *10.
123. Id. at *11.
124. See MICHAL-SKI supra note 4 at 109.

125. See Z.W. Julius Chen, Following the Leader: Twombly, Pleading Standards,and Procedural Uniformity, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 1439 (2008) (noting, "[S]tates that model their
procedural systems after the Federal Rules typically look to federal courts and particularly the
U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the Rules as a default. . .and procedural uniformity is
desirable.").
126. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
127. See lannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 888 N.E.2d 879 (2008).
128. Id. at 624, 888 N.E.2d, at 882
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the outside door handle systems in their vehicles were "noncompliant
with applicable federal safety standards, defective and unsafe" and
that Ford "knowingly manufactured, offered for sale, and refused to
recall vehicles that [did] not comply with federal safety standards."12 9
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts found the term "defect" to be
conclusory and subjective, stating, "[a] bare assertion that a defendant
has knowingly manufactured and sold a product that is defective or
suffers from safety-related defects does not suffice to state a viable
claim."' 3 0 The Supreme Court of Massachusetts followed the lead of
the U.S. Supreme Court stating, "[W]e take the opportunity to adopt
the standard that was recently articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly.

.

. what is required at the

pleading stage are factual allegations plausibly suggesting an entitlement to relief." 3 1
Further, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts noted, "[W]e agree
with the Supreme Court's analysis of the Conley language and we follow the lead in retiring its use." 13 2 The court recognized that allegations in this case would not be sufficient under the current pleading
requirements in Massachusetts but nonetheless adopted Twombly's
retirement of the "notice pleading" language.' 33 Therefore, in the
State of Massachusetts, plaintiffs must now state a claim that is 'plausible' on its face to survive a motion to dismiss.
B.

Ohio

In Williams v. Ohio Edison, the Court of Appeals of Ohio considered whether a lower court properly dismissed a collusion claim for
failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Ohio Rules of Civil
Procedure.13 4 Williams, a pro se plaintiff, brought suit against Ohio
Edison, a public utility, for allegedly violating the Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution and for allegedly violating
Ohio's statutory scheme for the garnishment of personal earnings. 3 5
129. Id.
130. Id. at 632-33, 888 N.E.2d at 888.
131. Id. at 635-36, 888 N.E.2d at 890.
132. Id.
133. See Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, Rational Pleading in the Modem
World of Civil Litigation: The Lessons and Public Policy Benefits of Twombly and Iqbal, 33
HARV. J.L. & Puu. PoY'v 1107, 1147 (2010).
134. See Williams v. Edison, 2009 WL 3490945 at *1 (Ohio App. 8 Dist. October 29, 2009).
135. Id. (Ohio Edison alleged that Williams was delinquent in payments for services provided.. William's balance was $5,969.21, together with interest at 10% per annum. On March 28,
2008 Williams amended her complaint to include allegations that Ohio Edison, and others had
colluded and committed abuse of process in order to avoid judgment being granted against them
in the lower court).
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After evaluating the requisite pleading standards in Ohio, the Court
of Appeals quoted the recent decision in Twombly, noting, "[t]he
claims set forth in the complaint must be plausible, rather than conceivable.. .William's obligation to provide grounds for her entitlement
to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formalistic
1 6
Thus, while the Court of
recitation of the elements will not suffice.""
Appeals of Ohio did not expressly adopt Twombly, it effectively
changed the interpretation of Ohio's state pleading requirements to
require a complaint to state a claim that is 'plausible' as opposed to
merely conceivable."'
C.

Minnesota
In the 2010 decision of Bahr v. Capella University, the Supreme

Court of Minnesota confirmed the court of appeals adoption of
Twombly's plausibility standard."' Bahr involved a suit brought by a
former employee of the online educator Capella University, alleging,
inter alia, that Capella terminated the plaintiff in retaliation of her
opposition to certain discriminatory practices and that such retaliatory
termination violated Minnesota's Human Rights Act. The Court of
Appeals of Minnesota had previously recognized, "[W]e are mindful
that the United States Supreme Court has recently corrected [the
Conley] standard insofar that.. .the statement of entitlement to relief
must go beyond 'labels and conclusions' or the 'speculative' presenta-

tion of a claim."1 39

On review, the Supreme Court of Minnesota affirmed the court of
appeals articulation of the current pleading requirement in Minnesota,
noting, "[a] legal conclusion in the complaint is not binding on us.. .a
plaintiff must provide more than labels and conclusions."1 40
D.

South Dakota

In the 2008 decision of Sisney v. State, the Supreme Court of South
Dakota joined the growing number of states adopting Twombly's
heighted pleading requirement within its own jurisdiction.14 ' In Sisney, a pro se prisoner filed a complaint against the State of South Dakota, the director of state prison operations, and the food service
136. Id. at *3 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)).

137. Id.
138. See Bahr v. Capella Univ., 788 N.W.2d 76, 80 (Minn. 2010) (Capella University sought
review of the court of appeals decision that reversed the granting of the university's motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted).
139. See Bahr v. Capella Univ., 765 N.W.2d 428, 436-37 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) rev'd., 788
N.W.2d 76 (Minn. 2010).
140. Bahr, 788 N.W.2d. at 80 (quoting Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 544).
141. See Sisney v. State, 754 N.w.2d 639 (S.D. 2008).
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provider alleging breach of contract to provide food services by
"[f]ailing to adequately provide kosher food" in accordance to his
Jewish faith and that his civil rights were violated.14 2 The defendants
moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted, arguing that Sisney's complaint alleging discrimination
and conspiracy did "not contain sufficient factual allegations."l 4 3 The
circuit court granted the defendants motion with prejudice and Sisney
appealed.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of South Dakota adopted the
Twombly standard and affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.' 44 The
court quoted Twombly, stating, "[a] plaintiff's obligation to provide
the 'grounds' of his 'entitlement to relief' requires more than labels
and conclusions, and a formalistic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do.""' The court further noted that in order to survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint "must allege facts, which,
taken as true raise more than a speculative right to relief."' 46
Other state courts have also taken the opportunity to adopt or otherwise endorse the heighted pleading requirement following Twombly
and Iqbal including: Delaware,' 4 7 Maine,' 4 8 Louisiana,'14 9 and Nebraska.so Moreover, Oklahoma has taken Twombly and Iqbal even
further by passing a specific class action reform bill based on the new
142. Id. at 641-42.
143. Id. at 642 (specifically, the defendants argued that the complaint did not contain sufficient factual allegations to support Sisney's federal constitutional claim of discrimination and
conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1985).
144. See Id. at 643.
145. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
146. Id.
147. See Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 929 (Del. Ch. 2007) (stating, "[Olur nation's
high court has now embraced the pleading principle that Delaware courts have long applied,
which is that a complaint must plead enough facts to plausibly suggest that the plaintiff will
ultimately be entitled to relief she seeks. If a complaint fails to do that and instead asserts mere
conclusions, a 12(b)(6) motion must be granted.").
148. See Bean v. Cummings, 2008 ME 18, 939 A.2d 676, 680 (the Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine noted, "[W]here the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure is identical to the comparable federal rule, we value constructions and comments on the federal rules as aids in construing our
parallel provision." Further, the court quoted Twombly, requiring heightened pleading in the
context of civil perjury claims).
149. See Tuban Petroleum, LLC v. SIARC, Inc. Et Al., 11 So.3d 519 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2009)
(applying Twombly in limited context of claim under Louisiana antitrust law. The court noted,
"[Tihe Louisiana Supreme Court has looked to the federal jurisprudence for guidance because
the federal and state antitrust statutes are virtually identical the United States Supreme Court
stated that, a formalistic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not suffice.").
150. See Doe v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Nebraska, 280 Neb. 492, 506, 788 N.W.2d 264, 278
(2010) (medical student brought action against state medical school alleging, inter alia, fraudulent concealment and violations of constitutional rights. In reviewing the district courts order
granting a motion to dismiss, the Supreme Court of Nebraska embraced Twombly and Iqbal,
"[W]e hold that to prevail against a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff must
allege sufficient facts, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.").
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"plausibility standard.""' Oklahoma State Bill 704 was enacted in
2011 and adopts the language from Twombly and Iqbal. Specifically,
class action litigants in Oklahoma now must present a petition that
contains "factual allegations sufficient to demonstrate a plausible
claim for relief."' 5 2 Thus, while some state courts have expressly
adopted the heightened pleading requirement articulated by the Supreme Court, some state legislatures have also joined the growing
trend. While the foregoing list is not exhaustive, it represents the majority if not all states that have embraced at least some portion of the
plausibility pleading standard.
V.

STATE COURTS THAT REJECT PLAUSIBILITY STANDARD

Not all state courts are prepared to "retire" Conley. Some state
courts have addressed Twombly or Iqbal and have chosen to expressly
reject the heightened pleading requirement.
A.

North Carolina

In Holleman v. Aiken, the North Carolina Court of Appeals declined to adopt the heightened pleading requirement set forth in
Twombly." Holleman involved various claims, including libel per se
and infliction of emotional distress brought by an author who wrote a
book about a celebrity singer.15 4 The plaintiff's claims were based primarily on the singer's failure to endorse the publication and defamatory statements made in connection with the publication. The plaintiff
appealed the trial court's order dismissing her complaint under rule
12(b)(6) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.15 5
On review, ironically, the plaintiff argued that the court should
adopt the "plausibility standard" as set forth in Twombly.156 The court
of appeals rejected this argument noting, the "[P]laintiff has correctly
noted that to date, North Carolina has not adopted the 'plausibility
standard' set forth in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly for 12(b)(6) motions to
dismiss, this court does not have the authority to adopt a new standard
of review of motions to dismiss.""' The court of appeals reiterated
151. See OKLA. SrA-r. ANN. TI. 12, § 2023 (West) ("[A]n action may be maintained as a class
action if the prerequisites of subsection A of this section are satisfied, if the petition in the class
action contains factual allegations sufficient to demonstrate a plausible claim for relief.").
152. See Id. § 2023.
153. See Holleman v. Aiken, 193 N.C. App. 484, 668 S.E.2d 579 (2008).
154. Id. at 487; 668 S.E.2d at 582 (the plaintiff was an author of a book written about singer
Clay Aiken, among the legal claims set forth by the plaintiff were libel per se, libel per quod,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and tortious
interference with a business relationship).
155. Id. at 490; 668 S.E.2d at 584.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 491; 668 S.E.2d at 584.
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the traditional pleading requirements, stating that "[T]he complaint
must be liberally construed. . .and the court should not dismiss a complaint unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff could not
prove any set of facts to support his claim."'

Interestingly, even as recent as April 2013, defendants have urged
North Carolina courts to adopt the 'plausibility' language. For example, in Bookman v. Britthaven, Inc., defendants appealed from the denial of a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss solely for the purpose of
preserving the issue of whether Iqbal should be adopted in North Carolina for future review under a writ of certiorari by the Supreme
Court of North Carolina.' 59
B.

Alabama

Similarly, the Alabama Court of Appeals has declined to embrace
the plausibility standard in its respective jurisdiction. In Crum v. Johns
Manville, various construction plaintiffs brought an action against a
roofing management company for negligence, wantonness, fraud, misrepresentation, breach of contract and breach of warranty.16 0 After
the trial court granted the defendant's 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the
plaintiffs appealed. On appeal, the defendant argued, "[T]he Supreme
Court in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly abrogated the rule set forth in Conley v. Gibson."16'
The court of appeals disagreed, noting, "[T]he United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
is not binding on this court's interpretation or application of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure."' 6 2 Since the Alabama Supreme
Court has not yet adopted the plausibility standard, the court of appeals also declined to do so.

158. Id. (quoting Craven v. Cope, 188 N.C. App. 814, 656 S.E.2d 729).
159. See Bookman v. Britthaven, Inc., No. COA12-663, 2013 WL 1314965 at *2 (N.C. Ct.
App. Apr. 2, 2013). ("[A]s for the denial of its motion to dismiss, Britthaven acknowledges that
such an order is not usually appealable prior to the entry of final judgment. Britthaven, however,
argues that this order involves an important issue of law that this Court should review under a
writ of certiorari issued pursuant to Appellate Rules 2 and 21(a)(2) in order to preserve the issue
for review by the North Carolina Supreme Court. The legal issue raised by Britthaven is whether
we should adopt the United States Supreme Court's standard for motions to dismiss for failure
to sate a claim for relief set out in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); the court of appeals also
noted that since an order denying a motion to dismiss may not be the subject of an interlocutory
appeal the court dismissed that portion of the defendant's appeal).
160. See Crum v. Johns Manville, 19 So. 3d 208 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009).
161. See Id. at 212 n.2.
162. Id.
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Tennessee:

Before to the Supreme Court of Tennessee expressly rejected the
plausibility standard, the Tennessee Court of Appeals had cited
Twombly and/or Iqbal in eight opinions.' 6 3 In fact, one decision purportedly recognized Twombly's applicability in Tennessee state courts,
while other decisions rejected the notion. 1 64 Any confusion as to the
proper pleading standard in Tennessee was settled in the 2011 decision
of Webb v. Nashville Area Habitatfor Humanity, Inc., when the Supreme Court of Tennessee went to great lengths to explain the reasons
for rejecting the plausibility standard.1 6 5
In Webb, an employee's complaint alleging retaliatory discharge
was dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. 1 6 6 The court of appeals vacated the dismissal and remanded
for further proceedings and the employer sought review by the Tennessee Supreme Court. 67 The Tennessee Supreme Court took the opportunity to reject the plausibility pleading standard set forth in
Twombly and Iqbal, stating:
[T]he Twombly and Iqbal decisions reflect a significant and substantial
departure from the United States Supreme Court's prior interpretations of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8 and the seventy-year history of a liberal notice
pleading standard as envisioned by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and recognized in Conley.168
The court went on to reject the plausibility standard insofar that it
"[i]ncorporates a determination of the likelihood of success on the
merits-a judicial weighing of the facts," which at such an early stage
in the proceeding is at odds with traditional notice pleading.16 9
Other states have also rejected the Twombly and/or Iqbal plausibility standard, including: Washington,' 70 Arizona,' 7 ' and Vermont.17 2
163. See Deja Vu of Nashville , Inc. v. Metro. Gov't, 311 S.W.3d 913, 918-19 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2009); State ex rel. Watson v. Waters, No. E2009-01753-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 3294109, at *4
(Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 20, 2010).
164. See Hermosa Holdings, Inc. v. Mid-Tenn. Bone & Joint Clinic, P.C., No. M2008-00597COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 711125, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2009).
165. See Webb v. Nashville Area Habitat for Humanity, Inc., 346 S.W.3d 422 (Tenn. 2011).
166. Id. at 424.
167. Id. (The plaintiff was employed by the Nashville Area Habitat for Humanity. Subsequent to her termination, she filed a complaint alleging retaliatory discharge under Tennessee
Public Protection Act ("TPPA") and the common law of Tennessee.).
168. See Id. at 430.
169. Id. at 431.
170. See McCurry v. Chevy Chase Bank, FSB, 169 Wash. 2d 96, 233 P.3d 861 (2010) (rejecting pleading standard in Twombly, calling the standard a 'drastic change' in court
procedure).
171. See Cullen v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 218 Ariz. 417, 189 P.3d 344 (2008) (retaining notice
pleading standard; noting that any modification of a pleading rule could only be effected by the
Arizona Supreme Court interpretation).
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States such as West Virginia 73 and Michiganl 74 have reserved judgment as to whether the standard should apply in their respective jurisdictions. Thus, while some states have embraced the plausibility
standard, others are hesitant to follow the lead of the Supreme Court
in changing their own rules of civil procedure.
VI.
A.

A

CALL TO "REPEAL" TWOMBLY

AND IQBAL

The Notice PleadingRestoration Act of 2009

Members of Congress have not been silent on the issue of plausibility pleading. In 2009, Senator Arlen Specter introduced Senate Bill
1504"17 which provided:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by an Act of Congress or by
an amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which takes
effect after the date of enactment of this Act, a Federal court shall not
dismiss a complaint under rule 12(b)(6) or (e) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, except under the standards set forth by the Supreme
Court of the United States in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).76
Senator Specter, along with others, argued that federal courts had
"consistently and faithfully"' 7 7 applied the traditional notice pleading
standard articulated in Conley, contenting that the new plausibility
standard granted too much discretion to trial judges at such an early
stage in the proceedings."7 Moreover, several senators criticized
Twombly and Iqbal insofar that it circumvents the process for amend-

172. See Colby v. Umbrella, Inc., 184 Vt. 1, 955 A. 2d 1082, 1087 n. 1 (2008) (noting, "[wle
have relied on the Conley standard for over twenty years and in no way are bound by federal
jurisprudence in interpreting our state pleading rules.").
173. See In Re Flood Coal River Watershed, 222 W.Va. 574, 668 S.E.2d 203, 216 n. 10 (2008)
("[A]lithough this court as not considered whether [the plausibility] standard should be adopted,
the plaintiffs complaint clearly meets that standard.").
174. See Duncan v. State, 284 Mich. App. 246, 774 N.W.2d 89, 136.
175. Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong. (2009) (Senator Spector
D-PA was joined by Senator Russell Feingold D-WI and Senator Harry Reid D-NV).
176. Id. at § 2.
177. See 155 CONG. REG. S7890 (daily ed. July 22, 2009) (statement made by Sen. Spector).
178. See Michael R. Huston, Pleadingwith Congress to Resist the Urge to Overrule Twombly
and Iqbal, 109 Micii. L. RiEv. 415, 425 (2010).
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ing the Federal Rules under the Rules Enabling Act."' However, after being referred to committee the bill died.180
B.

Open Access to Courts Act of 2009
On November 19, 2009 Representative Jerrold Nadler introduced

H.R. 4115,"' which varied slightly from its Senate counterpart,

providing:
[A] court shall not dismiss a complaint under subdivision (b)(6), (c) or
(e) of Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim which would entitle the plaintiff to relief. A court
shall not dismiss a complaint under one of those subdivisions on the
basis of a determination by the judge that the factual contents of the
complaint do not show the plaintiff's claim to be plausible or are insufficient to warrant a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.18 2
H.R. 4115 gained support from representatives who opposed
Twombly and Iqbal, many of whom argued the Supreme Court's decision was a "bypass" of the Rules Enabling Act.'8 However, after being referred to committee, H.R. 4115 died.18 4 While congressional
efforts have been unsuccessful so far, some scholars support such restorative legislation, finding the 'plausibility' standard inconsistent
with the views of the drafters of the Federal Rules.' 8 5 While it is unclear how corrective legislation would impact states who have already
chosen to adopt the new standard, the movement by Congress indicates the importance of this issue to federal pleading practice and the
future of civil litigation in this country.
179. Id. at 426 (the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2071 provides: (a) "[T]he Supreme
Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may from time to time prescribe rules for
the conduct of their business. Such rules shall be consistent with Acts of Congress and rules of
practice and procedure prescribed under section 2072 of this title. ?(b) Any rule prescribed by a
court, other than the Supreme Court, under subsection (a) shall be prescribed only after giving
appropriate public notice and an opportunity for comment. Such rule shall take effect upon the
date specified by the prescribing court and shall have such effect on pending proceedings as the
prescribing court may order. ?(c)(1) A rule of a district court prescribed under subsection (a)
shall remain in effect unless modified or abrogated by the judicial council of the relevant circuit.
?(2) Any other rule prescribed by a court other than the Supreme Court under subsection (a)
shall remain in effect unless modified or abrogated by the Judicial Conference.").
180. GovTrack.us. S.1504-111th Congress (2010) Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009,
http://www.govtrack.us/congressibills/1 11 /s4054.
181. Open Access to Courts Act of 2009, H.R. 4115, 111th Cong. (2009) (Representative
Nadler was joined by 36 co-sponsors).
182. Id at § 2078(a).
183. See HusroN, supra, note 178 at 427.
184. GovTrack.us. H.R. 4115-111th Congress (2009) Open Access to Courts Act of 2009,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hr4115.
185. See HERMANN, supra, note 8.
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CONCLUSION

Unfortunately, it appears the plausibility standard is here to stay.
While many state courts remain indecisive or silent on whether to
adopt Twombly and/or Iqbal, a 'plausible' assumption is that litigants
will be faced with heightened pleading requirements in the not so distant future. The defense bar is very aware of the implications of plausibility pleading and is slowly urging state courts to adopt the
requirement. While studies differ as to the impact of Twombly and
Iqbal, the standard has undoubtedly affected aggrieved plaintiffs in a
wide range of cases including civil rights and employment
discrimination.' 86
The most disturbing aspect of my research is the blind reliance by
some state courts on the Supreme Court's interpretation of Federal
Rule 8(a)(2)' 8 7 following Twombly and Iqbal. While procedural uniformity is certainly an important objective among states that model
their respective rules after the federal rules, the Supreme Court's interpretation of such procedural rules is in no way binding on the
states." 8 Justice Souter, the very creator of the facial plausibility requirement argued that the new two-pronged plausibility framework is
a patent "misapplication of Twombly."'"9 Because of Iqbal, litigants
will have to live with the unintended consequences of Twombly's
framework in not only federal jurisdictions but some state jurisdictions as well. As state courts continue to be urged by defendants to
adopt the heightened pleading standard. it is certain that many more
jurisdictions will choose to embrace it as a "new normal" in pleading
practice.

186. See GREEN, supra, note 11.
187. Fun. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
188. See MICHALSKI, supra, note 4.
189. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 689 (Souter, J., dissenting) (Justice Souter classified
the majority's opinion in Iqbal as a misapplication of Twombly).
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